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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Mr > i ii'irry agrees that this Court has jurisdiction of 
this matter p^x^^duit to Utah Code Aim, MU M I « i ' I'in U nrl 
78-45-1. ,__ 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW1 
A, Whether t h e d o c t r i n e ' i; ,|u LutbUv* e s Lappa,' "w^ f" \i. 
d e f e n s e a v a i l a b l e t o Mr,, I r i z a r r y on t n e S t a t e ' s c l a i m f o r back 
c h i l d SHIJI; i.) if I I I I • l i i i'is that : he f a t h e r e d . 
Standard of R« i Because this IM eiriui IHHUH ul Ln * ', I he 
C^nrt • e- ... r e d t o g i v e any d e f e r e n c e i n Judge R o t h ' s 
c ~_rtei *rer and L i g h t C o . , 800 P . 2d 
10V5, 10^ . ") 
B. Whether t h e t.n:ial com" committed c l e a r e r r o r i n 
i : : - -.; nit on the f a c t s of t h i s 
c a s e . s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h a t : 
1) Ms. e p r e s e n t e d '" I r i z a r r y 
t f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
2) Mr. i : : z , : : r y r e a s o n a b l y r e l i e d on Ms. P a r k e r ' s 
1
 P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t i d e n t i f i e s a t h i r d i s s u e , "Whether the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s f i nd ings of f ac t were s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a l l the elements of 
e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l , " but does not argue t h i s i s sue in i t s b r i e f . Accordingly, 
the Court should not cons ider t h a t i s s u e on t h i s appea l . See S t a t e v. Wareham. 
772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (br ie f must con ta in support fo r each content ion); 
S t a t e v . Yates , 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Ct. App 1992) (court dec l ined t o cons ider 
argument t h a t was not adequate ly briefed.) . 
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3) Mr. Irizarry would suffer harm if Ms. Parker 
is now able to collect child support for the 
four year period prior to the commencement of 
this action. 
S t a n d a r d of Review: The s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w on t h i s i s s u e 
i s c l e a r e r r o r . The C o u r t may n o t r e v e r s e J u d g e R o t h ' s f i n d i n g s 
u n l e s s , v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t mos t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e 
f i n d i n g s , t h e e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s o r 
t h e f i n d i n g s a r e o t h e r w i s e c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . See S c h i n d l e r v . 
S c h i n d l e r . 776 P . 2 d 84 , 88 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) . ffA f i n d i n g i s c l e a r l y 
e r r o n e o u s when . . . t h e r e v i e w i n g c o u r t i s ' l e f t w i t h t h e d e f i n i t e 
and f i r m c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a m i s t a k e h a s b e e n c o m m i t t e d . ' 1 1 I d . 
( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) . " [T] he mere f a c t t h a t [ t h e c o u r t ] m i g h t r e a c h 
a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t t h a n t h e t r i a l c o u r t on t h e same e v i d e n c e d o e s 
n o t j u s t i f y s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s . " I d . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. I r i z a r r y g e n e r a l l y a g r e e s w i t h t h e S t a t e ' s 2 s t a t e m e n t 
of t h e c a s e , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e t r i a l d a t e , wh ich was F e b r u -
a r y 9 , n o t F e b r u a r y 10 , 1 9 9 3 . I n a d d i t i o n , i n t h e e v e n t t h e C o u r t 
c o n s i d e r s t h e t h i r d i s s u e r a i s e d by t h e S t a t e , Mr. I r i z a r r y w i s h e s 
2
 Despite the S t a t e ' s confusing reference t o a p p e l l a n t s / p l a i n t i f f s , 
there i s only one p l a i n t i f f in t h i s matter, the State of Utah on behalf of Ms. 
Parker. Appellee therefore w i l l re fer to appellant as the S ta te , and re fer t o 
Ms. Parker by name where otherwise appropriate. 
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5nform the Cour of '; "ol lowi na history concerning the ^ud-
^- martyr 
JucUj.. u^-«a,w . _*_ _ 
matter, however, w .s set and occurred at - * mi*-* .u ex uuayc Sctw^,^ 
r- ' - T,essf ' .. >k office. 
Consequent 1 . - IVUU*. i^a. 
February : ije Roth - H: Hidings and coiiw^us^ ...J 
Feinua r 
M I i*<r ^ 1 O S e U i . 
Mr. Trizarrv . - iu .sel, Mi- i tnei r e p a r e w r i t t e n f i n d i i 
cc * e m a f t e r c o ' ' ° o f * *-•> V r e f e r r e d ^. a s 
" f i n d i n g s - .cii.Lue, ^ ^nd a t t . . . . i 
t o the ^tat^* f ;a<y<-> v W n s o n , t" i a p p r o v a l a s * ^ ; 
Bl a t t n e y vjeiitj*" - ^ f f i ^ e f~haf 
Wilson was j\t . I I J *WW unavai" ' , , ! ' , r 
t h e r e f o r e f i l e d h e r p r o p o s e d i : :nd ;ng^ w;i - if r o i i r t c i e r - w: cnout 
o b i ci i 
3
 This d e t a i l i s made r e l e v a n t by the s t a t e ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t Judge Roth 
d id not make " c l e a r f i nd ings" on an element of es toppe l and that the l ack of 
c l a r i t y should opera te a g a i n s t Mr. I r i z a r r y in t h i s ma t t e r (Appe l l an t ' s Brief a t 
43) . Any lack of c l a r i t y in Judge Ro th ' s f ind ings and conc lus ions should not be 
he ld a g a i n s t Mr. I r i z a r r y in t h i s c a s e . The S t a t e has the burden of persuasion 
on t h i s appea l . See Kohler v. Garden Ci ty , 639 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1981). I t 
was t he S t a t e ' s behavior t h a t provoked Judge Roth ' s r e f u s a l t o cons ider more 
d e t a i l e d w r i t t e n f ind ings in t h i s ma t t e r , and the S t a t e ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t i t 
would not appeal t h i s ma t t e r t h a t l ed Mr. I r i z a r r y t o agree t o accept Judge 
Roth ' s o r a l f ind ings as the w r i t t e n f ind ings in t h i s case r a t h e r than engage in 
a b a t t l e t o ob ta in a r u l i n g on more s p e c i f i c w r i t t e n f i nd ings p repared by the 
p a r t i e s . The background informat ion s e t f o r t h in the t ex t on t h i s p o i n t i s made 
on the persona l knowledge of Ms. B l a t t n e r who i s the au thor of t h i s b r i e f . 
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Once Mr. Wilson returned to work, he and Ms. Blattner 
spoke about objections that he had to the dollar amounts reflected 
in Ms. Blattner's findings as well as to other aspects of those 
findings. The parties agreed that they could resolve Mr. Wilson's 
objections to the dollar amounts, and therefore agreed that Ms. 
Blattner would prepare a new set of findings reflecting these 
agreed upon amounts, and submit them to the court as a substitute 
for her previously filed findings. The parties also agreed that 
Mr. Wilson would file his objections to the other aspects of Ms. 
Blattner's findings. Ms. Blattner submitted the substitute set to 
Judge Roth with an appropriate cover letter. (R.667-85.) 
Mr. Wilson then filed his objections. (R.375-94.) 
Rather than submit objections to specific paragraphs of or language 
in Ms. Blattner's proposed findings, however, Mr. Wilson filed a 
general objection to the findings and an entirely new and different 
set of findings, conclusions, and a judgment. (Id.) Ms. Blattner 
therefore filed a response to that objection, asserting that the 
general nature of the objection and the entirely new submission was 
improper. (R.395-401.) Mr. Wilson then requested a hearing on the 
findings. (R.402-03.) 
On April 8, 1993, Judge Roth apparently became irritated 
with having been asked to choose between Ms. Blattner's and Mr. 
Wilson's sets of findings and elected to adopt his oral findings 
rather than rule on the written findings submitted by Ms. Blattner. 
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(R.373.) In the meantime, Judge Medley took off ice and reviewed 
the f i l e . Through a d i s t r i c t court c l e r k ' s e r ro r , the f i l e a t the 
time Judge Medley saw i t did not contain Ms. B l a t t n e r ' s submitted 
findings or her objection to Mr. Wilson's submission.4 Judge 
Medley signed Mr. Wilson's f indings, conclusions, and judgment --
the only ones in the f i l e . 
When Ms. Bla t tner and Mr. Wilson became aware of Judge 
Roth's and Judge Medley's ac t ions , they discussed the s i t u a t i o n . 
Ms. Bla t tner and Mr. Wilson f e l t tha t they were between a rock and 
a hard place -- Judge Medley had taken the bench but , because he 
had not conducted the t r i a l , was not in a good pos i t ion to resolve 
the dispute between the p a r t i e s ' wr i t t en f indings; Judge Roth had 
expressed h is unwillingness to do so. Mr. Wilson to ld Ms. Bla t tner 
tha t the Sta te was not planning to appeal the matter on Ms. 
Parker ' s behalf, and i t s primary i n t e r e s t was in ge t t ing a judgment 
entered for the ongoing support and the past due support tha t Judge 
Roth had awarded. Consequently, r a the r than f ight about appropri-
a te f indings, Ms. Bla t tner and Mr. Wilson s t i pu l a t ed tha t they 
would accept Judge Roth's oral f indings, they would move Judge 
Medley to vacate the f indings, conclusions and judgment tha t he had 
4
 At the time Ms. B l a t t n e r r ece ived p l a i n t i f f / a p p e l l a n t ' s brief , the 
C o u r t ' s f i l e s t i l l d id not con ta in Ms. B l a t t n e r ' s f ind ings . Accordingly, on 
March 1, 1994, the p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t the record was inaccurate and that Ms. 
B l a t t n e r ' s f i nd ings should be inc luded in the record on appeal. (R.636-61.) The 
Order r e f l e c t i n g t h a t a d d i t i o n t o the record was s igned by Judge Medley on March 
2, 1994. (R.662-87.) 
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entered, and they would work out a stipulated judgment to be 
entered by Judge Medley in place of the vacated judgment. The 
parties then followed this course of action. (R.404-10.) 
Further delays occurred in getting the matter resolved. 
Ms. Blattner and Mr. Wilson had two conference calls with Judge 
Medley explaining the situation to him and asking him to rule on 
their stipulated Motion and Judgment. After their second call but 
before the judgment was entered, Mr. Wilson left the Attorney 
General's office. After he left, Ms. Blattner was contacted by 
Karma Dixon, another attorney in the Attorney General's office, who 
informed her that the judgment still had not been signed. 
Consequently, Ms. Blattner and Ms. Dixon had a conference call with 
Judge Medley asking him to enter the judgment. After Judge Medley 
rang off, Ms. Dixon informed Ms. Blattner that she was sorry that 
Mr. Wilson had represented to Ms. Blattner that the State would not 
appeal the matter because the State did intend to appeal it. Judge 
Medley entered the stipulated Judgment on August 11, 1993. (R.414-
18.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Irizarry disagrees with the following "facts" set 
forth by the State: 
1. That Ms. Parker called Mr. Irizarry in November 1984 
(Appellant's Brief at 6). Ms. Parker so testified, but Mr. 
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Irizarry denied that she ever called him in the period between 
September 1984 and June 1985. (R.572.) 
2. That in June 1985 Ms. Parker left a message with Mr. 
Irizarry's roommate asking Mr. Irizarry to call her (Appellant's 
Brief at 6). Ms. Parker so testified at trial, but her testimony 
was impeached by her deposition testimony in which she testified 
that the June telephone call did not include such a message. 
(R.990-91.) Mr. Irizarry testified at trial that the phone message 
he got did not request him to call her. (R.574.). 
3. That Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry discussed the twins 
in July 1985 and arranged to meet in October 1985 (Appellant's 
Brief at 7). Ms. Parker so testified at trial, but Mr. Irizarry 
denied that such a conversation had taken place. (R.574.) 
Mr. Irizarry generally agrees with the remainder of the 
State's statement of facts, but offers the following additional 
facts. 
The relationship between Mr. Irizarry and Ms. Parker was 
very brief. When Ms. Parker got pregnant, she had known Mr. 
Irizarry only four weeks. (R.479.) Mr. Irizarry testified that he 
"hardly knew" Ms. Parker (R.556), and that during that timeframe he 
saw Ms. Parker only five or six times and had sexual intercourse 
with her three of those times. (R.550-54.) 
Concerning the communications between Mr. Irizarry and 
Ms. Parker between September 1984 and June 1985, Mr. Irizarry 
96601 7 
testified that on at least three occasions, in September 1984, in 
November 1984, and January 1985, Ms. Parker told him that she did 
not want his financial help and wanted nothing to do with him. 
(R.566-72.) Mr. Irizarry also testified that in that timeframe, 
Ms. Parker never initiated a phone call to him. (R.572.) The only 
time that Ms. Parker did call him was in June 1985, when she called 
and left a message with one of his ROTC roommates, Barbara, that 
she had named the twins "Parker." (R.573-74.) Contrary to Ms. 
Parker's testimony concerning the substance of that message, Ms. 
Parker did not tell Barbara that Mr. Irizarry should return her 
call. (R.574.) In fact, Ms. Parker hung up on Barbara. (Id.) 
Moreover, Ms. Parker testified that in the period from August 1984 
until this lawsuit was filed, she did not recall ever asking Mr. 
Irizarry for financial help. (R.487-88.) 
Concerning the alleged telephone conversation in July 
1985 in which Mr. Irizarry and Ms. Parker allegedly agreed to meet 
in October 1985, Mr. Irizarry denied that such a conversation ever 
took place. (R.574.) Mr. Irizarry also denied speaking with Ms. 
Parker in October 1985, and denied knowing at that time that Ms. 
Parker telephoned and visited his father, Andre, in October 1985. 
(R.576.) Mr. Irizarry married his fiancee, Patty, and went to 
Puerto Rico in October 1985. (Id.) Mr. Irizarry first learned of 
Ms. Parker's visit to Andre in February 1986, when Andre told him 
that Ms. Parker had come to see him in October 1985 to make sure 
96601 8 
that he knew he was a grandfather, (R.576-77.) Andre said nothing 
about any desire that Ms. Parker may have had concerning financial 
support. (Id.) 
Concerning Mr. Irizarry's relationship with his current 
wife, Patty Irizarry, Mr. Irizarry began dating Patty in February 
or March 1984 (R.577) , more than one month after Ms. Parker had 
refused his help for the second time and had made clear her desire 
that he stay out of her life and the lives of the twins by telling 
him that under no circumstances would she name the twins 
"Irizarry", and that she intended to give the children her last 
name. (R.566-72.) Patty Irizarry became pregnant with Mr. 
Irizarry's child in approximately July 1985 (R.578), a month after 
Ms. Parker had informed Mr. Irizarry that she had in fact named the 
children "Parker". Mr. Irizarry married Mrs. Irizarry in October 
1985 and moved to Puerto Rico. (R.577.) Mr. and Mrs. Irizarry re-
mained in Puerto Rico until September 1987, when they returned to 
Utah. (R.580.) 
Concerning Ms. Parker's alleged efforts to locate Mr. 
Irizarry, Mr. Irizarry was not aware that Ms. Parker had hired a 
private investigator to find him in 19 87. (Id.) In late September 
or early October 1987, Mr. Irizarry received a letter written by 
Ms. Parker's mother, to his brother, Javier, and forwarded to him 
by his brother Javier, which stated: 
96601 9 
I am Cathy Parker's mother and would appreci-
ate it very much if you would give Harry a 
message from us. It is that we are sorry he 
feels no obligation to his two children. I 
know he doesn't claim them, but they are his. 
We hope he loses his bitterness - we have 
none. Cathy does not love Harry either but 
that does not mean she will cease caring for 
his children. 
We hope Harry is successful in life and if he 
chooses not to accept his children that is his 
decision. 
I personally feel he will be very sorry later 
but that too is his decision. 
The children are two now and are very tall for 
their age - they still have blue eyes but 
eventually will turn to hazel. They are 
gorgeous! 
Harry is missing out on a lot, but tell him we 
appreciate him not making trouble for the 
children. A divided home is bad, and it is 
better for them never to have known their dad 
rather than to have one whc sees them occa-
sionally and doesn't accept them. If he 
doesn't love them, they are better off without 
him. 
We will never speak evil of him to them be-
cause that would be wrong. Harry is a very 
fine young man and his life is his own to work 
out - we wish the best for him. 
The picture is of the children on their 2nd 
birthday. 
I do hope you will forward this letter and 
picture to him. 
We are not concerned about taking him to court 
Javier - His court will come later - he cannot 
say they are not his children there. 
10 
(R.580 & Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3.) Mr. Irizarry interpreted this 
letter to mean that neither Ms. Parker nor her mother wanted him to 
be involved with the twins. (R.582-83.) 
Concerning Mr. Irizarry's ability to pay back child 
support, Mr. Irizarry was at the time of trial the sole financial 
support for himself, his wife, and four children. (See R.60-62, 
427-28, 549, 587.) He was also paying approximately $207 per month 
in child support for the support of the twins under a temporary 
child support order. (R.248-52.) He was earning approximately 
$1834 per month. (R.547.) He had minimal savings of about $50 to 
$100 dollars, and owned no stocks or bonds. (R.548.) Had he known 
that Ms. Parker would be looking to him for child support he would 
probably have done things differently. (R.587.) 
Concerning care of the twins in the timeframe for which 
back child support is sought, Ms. Parker provided financially for 
the twins. (R.509.) The twins never went without food, shelter, or 
clothing (R.508-09.) At the time of trial, Ms. Parker intended to 
use a portion of any back child support award to reimburse herself 
for debts she had incurred in support of the twins, and the 
remainder of the funds to provide for the twins' future education 
and support. (R.509-10.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The case of Burrow v. Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), is valid and controlling precedent that allows Mr. 
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Irizarry to raise the defense of equitable estoppel in this case. 
The State did not challenge the legitimacy of Vrontikis at the 
trial court level and is not entitled to do so here. 
Even if the State could make such a challenge, however, 
and even if Vrontikis were procedurally invalid, the case of 
Borland v. Chandler. 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) dictates the conclu-
sion that equitable estoppel is a defense available to Mr. Irizarry 
in this action. 
Moreover, even if Borland does not dictate the conclusion 
that an equitable estoppel defense is available to Mr. Irizarry in 
this action, the State's claim is barred by the doctrines set forth 
in Baggs v. Anderson. 528 P. 2d 141 (Utah 1974) (estopping a 
mother's claim to reimbursement), and Wasescha v. Wasescha. 548 
P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) (preventing children from collecting "double 
support"). 
Further, Mr. Irizarry's right to raise the estoppel 
defense is not impinged by the fact that the State is a party to 
this action. The State is suing Mr. Irizarry on behalf of Ms. 
Parker, under an assignment of her rights. The State can have no 
greater right than Ms. Parker has in pursuing this claim. 
Finally, the trial court did not err in finding that the 
facts of this case support Mr. Irizarry's defense of estoppel. The 
issue of whether Ms. Parker made representations turned on a 
question of witness credibility, which question the court resolved 
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in favor of Mr. Irizarry. The other elements of estoppel were also 




A. THE STATE IS BARRED FROM CONTESTING THE 
PRECEDENTIAL VALIDITY OF VRONTIKIS BE-
CAUSE THE STATE DID NOT RAISE THIS ARGU-
MENT BELOW. 
The State raises the precedential validity of the opinion 
in Burrow v. Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
for the first time in its appellate brief. At the trial court 
level, the State conceded that Vrontikis was valid law, and framed 
the issue before the court as whether the doctrines of laches and 
equitable estoppel as outlined in Vrontikis were implicated by the 
facts of this case. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 5-6 (R.311-12);; 
R. 606-09. No argument was ever made below that Vrontikis was 
unavailable as precedent as a matter of law -- only that it was 
distinguishable on its facts. 
The bulk of the trial below focused on whether the 
defendant was obligated to pay child support for the period before 
the suit was filed, or whether Ms. Parker's actions met the test in 
Vrontikis and estopped her from asserting a right to that support. 
As a matter of policy, and as a matter of law, the State should not 
be afforded an opportunity to undo a judgment with arguments it 
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failed to make when the time was ripe. See, e.g.. Lane v. Messen. 
731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986) (issues not raised at trial court 
level will not be considered on appeal). 
B. VRONTIKIS IS CONTROLLING PRECEDENT ON 
THIS COURT. 
Even assuming, arguendo. that the Court considers the 
State's arguments concerning the validity of Burrow v. Vrontikis, 
those arguments are unconvincing. 
1. As a Procedural Matter, "Vrontikis I" Was 
Properly Issued as an Unpublished Opinion. The State argues that 
the Court of Appeals was "cavalier" in deciding "Vrontikis I" 
without a published opinion, relying on Rule 31, Utah R. App. P. 
The State misapprehends the language of Rule 31. Notwithstanding 
Justice Zimmerman's dicta in State v. Gardiner5, the language of 
Rule 31 refers to decisions issued on expedited hearings without 
written opinions, not to decisions issued on a non-expedited basis 
in written opinion form, but unpublished. While it is certainly 
helpful to the Bar to publish an opinion, the precedential effect 
of a written but unpublished decision is not affected by the 
language of Rule 31. 
2. The State Has Not Been Hindered by the Lack of 
a Published Opinion in "Vrontikis I". Contrary to the State's 
protestations, it is not "impossible" for the parties in this 
814 P . 2 d 5 6 8 , 5 7 0 n . l (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) . 
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appeal to analyze the Court's decision. In Vrontikis, the Court 
stated that its "Vrontikis I" ruling was based on the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Borland v. Chandler.6 788 P.2d at 1047. The 
Borland Court held 
it is well established that equitable defenses 
may be applied in actions at law and that 
principles of equity apply wherever necessary 
to prevent injustice. . . . Therefore it is 
clear that under appropriate circumstances, 
laches may bar an action for paternity. 
733 P.2d at 146. The Borland Court then expressly overruled Zito 
v. Butler7, an action in which the Zito Court had ruled that laches 
were not applicable in a paternity and child support action because 
the action was based on a statute, rather than on common law. 
There is no mystery behind the Vrontikis opinion. The 
Court of Appeals' analysis in "Vrontikis I" is readily seen from 
the Court's explanation of that holding in Vrontikis: namely, that 
(1) Zito said laches and equitable estoppel did not apply to child 
support and paternity actions because they are statutory actions; 
(2) Borland says equitable defenses are available in statutory 
actions, therefore laches is available in a paternity actions and 
Zito is wrong; and, as a consequence, (3) equitable defenses of 
laches and estoppel do apply to child support and paternity 
actions. 
6
 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
7
 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978). 
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3. Vrontikis is Controlling. "Vrontikis I11 was properly 
issued and relied upon by the Vrontikis Court, both because it did 
not have to be published, and because it was the law of the case. 
Obviously, however, even if the Vrontikis Court could not have 
relied on "Vrontikis I", it would have reached the same decision on 
the basis of the same case law it considered in deciding "Vrontikis 
I". There is absolutely no suggestion in Vrontikis that its 
earlier unpublished holding was ill-advised but nonetheless binding 
on it under the law of the case doctrine. Accordingly, Vrontikis 
is valid law and binding precedent on this Court. 
C. EVEN IF VRONTIKIS WERE NOT BINDING PRECE-
DENT, BORLAND DICTATES THE SAME OUTCOME. 
The State asserts that in the absence of Vrontikis. the 
question is open as to whether laches and estoppel apply to child 
support claims. The Borland case, however, which predates 
Vrontikis. effectively answered that question. The Borland Court, 
in a paternity case, made a fundamental statement: 
equitable defenses may be applied in actions 
at law and that principles of equity apply 
wherever necessary to prevent injustice. 
Borland. 733 P.2d at 146. Relying directly on this statement, the 
Court said, "Therefore, it is clear that under appropriate 
circumstances, laches may bar an action for paternity." Id. The 
Court also said that "to the extent that Zito stands for the 
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proposi t ion tha t an equi table defense i s not ava i l ab le , i t i s an 
incorrec t statement of the law and i s overruled." Id . 
Given t h i s language, the Sta te reads Borland far too 
narrowly. The Borland opinion reaches fa r the r than i t s holding 
tha t laches i s an ava i lab le defense in a pa t e rn i t y case. The 
opinion stands for the concept tha t equi table defenses are ava i l -
able to a l l c i v i l s t a tu to ry claims, and tha t the "appropriate 
circumstances" are merely those factual s i t u a t i o n s in which the 
elements of the asser ted defense are present . 
The Borland Court 's language does not suggest tha t 
equi table defenses are ava i lab le in some types of s t a tu to ry ac t ions 
(e .g . pa tern i ty) and not in others (e .g . chi ld support) as the 
Sta te a s s e r t s . 8 This i s apparent from the Court ' s analys is of the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of laches . 9 The Court 's ana lys is focused on the 
p a r t i c u l a r facts of Borland and whether those fac ts met the 
necessary elements of laches . Had the Court intended tha t the 
nature of the claim governed the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the defense, 
8
 The State draws an a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between paterni ty act ions 
and ch i ld support act ions for the purpose of applying an equitable defense. The 
b i o l o g i c a l parent has the ob l igat ion to support the ch i ld because that parent was 
responsible for conception of the ch i ld . If, by v ir tue of Borland, an equitable 
defense i s ava i lab le to a man to prevent a ch i ld from determining that the man 
i s h i s father, thus removing both the man's t i t l e as "father" and the ob l igat ion 
he has to support the ch i ld , i . e . , a paterni ty act ion , i t i s t o t a l l y i l l o g i c a l 
to preclude an equitable defense in a ch i ld support ac t ion , where the outcome --
removal of the man's ob l igat ion to support the c h i l d for the pr ior four years --
i s l e s s d r a s t i c . See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1993). 
9
 This i s a l s o apparent from the Court's reference to Zi to . In 
overruling Zito, the Borland Court did not d i s t ingu i sh the ch i ld support aspect 
from the paterni ty aspect of that case, an explanation that would have been 
expected had the Borland Court's intent been as l imi ted as the State suggests . 
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surely the Court would have analyzed the paternity claim from that 
perspective, dwelling on the policies implicated by the claim and 
distinguishing the paternity claim from other types of statutory 
claims in which equitable defenses would l ikely not be available.10 
Consequently, contrary to the S ta te ' s assert ion, even if 
Vrontikis were not binding on th is Court, the question of whether 
the use of an equitable defense to avoid a child support obligation 
i s an "appropriate circumstance" is not unanswered. Borland 
10
 The State argues that equitable estoppel should never be ava i lab le 
as a defense in a ch i ld support ac t ion , but that i t should be ava i lab le "as a 
sword by the mother, the ch i ld or the publ ic authority t o hold a l e g a l . . . father 
responsible for the f inanc ia l support to that c h i l d . " This i s a very lop-s ided 
view of the world. Not a l l non-custodial fathers who have not paid c h i l d support 
are deadbeats. Many of them, l i k e Mr. Ir izarry , attempted t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
for t h e i r ac t ions but were e f f e c t i v e l y precluded from doing so by the c h i l d ' s 
mother. 
B io log ica l parents both have the ob l iga t ion to look out for the best 
i n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d . Accord Utah Code Ann^ §§ 78-45-3 and 78-45-4 (1993). 
For the non-custodial father , t h i s means trying to help f i n a n c i a l l y . For the 
custodia l mother, i t means making f inanc ia l help from the father p o s s i b l e . A 
mother who t e l l s a father she does not want h i s help e f f e c t i v e l y t e l l s him that 
she i s prepared to take over h i s f inanc ia l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o the c h i l d . When 
and i f she changes her mind, and that change of mind i s a c t i v e l y or construct ive -
l y communicated to the father , i t makes sense that from that point forward the 
father should be responsible for ongoing ch i ld support -- he i s aware of the 
need, aware of her des ire that he help, and can plan accordingly. 
With respect to back ch i ld support, however, the e q u i t i e s weigh 
against the mother. The ch i ld , a f t er a l l , t y p i c a l l y has been supported. The 
mother or the s t a t e has paid for the c h i l d ' s upkeep, making the act ion primari ly 
one to recoup past expenditures. A father should not be saddled with years worth 
of past ch i ld support payments when he did not plan for them and undertook other 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in re l iance on the mother's representat ion that she was not 
looking to him for support. 
For be t t er or for worse, chi ldren are a f f ec ted by the choices of 
t h e i r parents every day. Where a mother r e j e c t s help, both the c h i l d and the 
mother may suffer f i n a n c i a l l y . The mother, however, not the father , i s 
responsible for that r e s u l t . The mother can seek ongoing support and correct the 
future . She should not, however, be permitted to absolve herse l f for her f o l l y 
in the past by causing ye t another person, the father , t o suf fer for i t . 
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answered t h a t q u e s t i o n a f f i r m a t i v e l y . 1 1 On t h e b a s i s of B o r l a n d , 
e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l was a d e f e n s e a v a i l a b l e t o Mr, I r i z a r r y i n 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e S t a t e ' s c l a i m f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t . 
D. EVEN I F BORLAND DOES NOT STAND FOR THE 
PROPOSITION THAT ESTOPPEL IS AVAILABLE IN 
AN ACTION FOR BACK CHILD SUPPORT, OTHER 
UTAH CASE LAW SUPPORTS JUDGE ROTH'S FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
R e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r B o r l a n d i s p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d t o 
a l l o w t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of e s t o p p e l t o c h i l d s u p p o r t a c t i o n s , t h e 
c a s e s of Baggs v . A n d e r s o n . 528 P .2d 141 (Utah 1974) and Wasescha 
v . Wasescha . 548 P .2d 895 (Utah 1 9 7 6 ) , b a r t h e S t a t e ' s c l a i m . 
I n Baggs , a m o t h e r sued t h e f a t h e r f o r t h e nonpayment of 
c h i l d s u p p o r t u n d e r t h e t e r m s of a d i v o r c e d e c r e e . The f a t h e r 
c l a i m e d t h e m o t h e r was e s t o p p e d b a s e d on an a g r e e m e n t t h a t he and 
t h e m o t h e r had s i g n e d , and b a s e d on r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t t h e m o t h e r 
and h e r s econd husband had made. 52 8 P .2d a t 1 4 3 . The Baggs Cour t 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d be tween t h e c h i l d ' s r i g h t t o r e c e i v e c u r r e n t and 
ongo ing s u p p o r t , and t h e m o t h e r ' s r i g h t t o r e c e i v e r e i m b u r s e m e n t 
f o r p a s t s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d r e n . I d . The Cour t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t 
a l t h o u g h e s t o p p e l by a m o t h e r ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o u l d n o t a p p l y t o 
b a r a c h i l d ' s c l a i m f o r c u r r e n t and ongo ing s u p p o r t , i t c o u l d a p p l y 
t o b a r a m o t h e r ' s c l a i m f o r r e i m b u r s e m e n t . I d . The C o u r t t h e n 
11
 The State argues that estoppel i s not appropriate here because a 
ch i ld support act ion i s unique as one in which the State i s a party and the ch i ld 
i s the real party in i n t e r e s t . See Appellants' Brief at 25-26. These fac tors , 
however, were present in Borland but did not preclude appl icat ion of an equitable 
defense there . 
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interpreted the claim at issue to be the child's claim for current 
and ongoing support, and held that assertion of that claim was not 
estopped. Id. at 143-44. 
The reimbursement aspect of Baggs is applicable to Ms. 
Parker's claim. This suit is brought by the State on Ms. Parker's 
behalf. Ms. Parker testified at trial that she was seeking 
reimbursement from Mr. Irizarry for amounts that she spent in 
supporting the twins (R.460) , and that if she were awarded back 
child support, she would use a portion of the money to pay debts 
she had incurred in raising the children. (R.510.) Thus, even if 
Vrontikis and Borland do not supply the rule of decision in this 
case, Judge Roth's ruling applying the doctrine of estoppel was 
still proper under Baggs. at least as to any amounts that Ms. 
Parker intended to use for reimbursement. 
As to the remainder of the back child support claim, it 
is barred by the doctrine enunciated in Wasescha v. Wasescha. In 
Wasescha, a mother brought an action against the father seeking to 
recover accrued child support. The mother asserted that she was 
not bringing a claim for reimbursement for support that she and her 
husband rendered to the children, but that she was intending to 
place the money "in trust for the benefit of the children to help 
them with further education or living, whatever their needs may 
be." Id. at 896. The Court took these statements by the mother to 
be an admission that the children were supported by her and her new 
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husband "unaccompanied with hunger, housing or humiliation." Id. 
The Court then stated: 
There is no prayer for reimbursement for past 
support under such conditions, but there seems 
to be an admission that the children's right 
to support amply was supplied by someone, 
which would eliminate their claim for support 
or. if you please, double support, and which 
admissions would seem to be an abandonment of 
a parent's claim for reimbursement, and cer-
tainly an estoppel to assert an antithetical 
claim for past child support, -- unless a case 
were instituted refutedly to assert the 
children's right to support, which, of course, 
is theirs, but seems not to be the case extant 
here. 
Id. at 896 (emphasis added) . The Court then held that the child's 
claim to support had been satisfied, and that the mother's claim 
against the father for past support owed was barred. Id. 
The case at bar is on all fours with Wasescha. At trial, 
Ms. Parker testified that she intended to use the majority of any 
back child support award to benefit the twins and provide for their 
future education and support. (R.508-10.) Ms. Parker further 
admitted that during the timeframe for which she seeks back child 
support she provided financial support for the twins, and that they 
never went without food, shelter, or clothing. (R.508-09.) 
Accordingly, to the extent that Ms. Parker intended to use the 
funds to support the children, her claim is estopped under 
Wasescha. and any error in Judge Roth's ruling is harmless. 
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E. MR. IRIZARRY IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM AS-
SERTING AN ESTOPPEL DEFENSE AGAINST THE 
STATE. 
1. The State Failed to Assert This Argument Below. 
As with its argument concerning the validity of Vrontikis as prece-
dent, the State did not argue at the trial court level that it, by 
virtue of its sovereignty, was immune from an estoppel argument. 
Accordingly, the State should not be permitted to entertain that 
argument here. See, e.g.. Lane v. Messen. 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 
1986); Bundy v. Century Equip. Co.. 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984) 
(issue not raised at trial court level will not be considered on 
appeal). 
2. The State's Claim is Totally Derivative. The 
estoppel cases cited by the State (Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & 
Co.12 and Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.13) do not help its 
position. Those cases stand for the proposition that the State and 
its agencies generally cannot be estopped by their own acts. The 
cases involve estoppel in circumstances where (1) the state or its 
agency has itself made the estopping representation, and (2) the 
state or its agency has a direct interest, rather than a derivative 
one, in the claim asserted. 
The claim at issue here is Ms. Parker's -- the State 
brought this lawsuit on her behalf. The State has no independent 
12
 646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) . 
13
 795 P.2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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interest in the outcome of this claim for back child support. The 
State is not seeking reimbursement for money that it spent in 
support of the twins, because it did not support the twins during 
the timeframe at issue. (See R.508 (Ms. Parker supported the 
twins).) Nor is any interest the State may have in ensuring that 
the twins remain off of welfare implicated here -- this claim is 
only for back child support as opposed to ongoing support, and Mr. 
Irizarry is paying ongoing support. This is not a criminal 
prosecution, as was the case of Leet v. Leet. 624 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 
1981), cited by the State. Rather, this is a simple civil matter, 
in which it appears that the State's interest is entirely deriva-
tive. The State is merely the assignee of Ms. Parker's claim. It 
is well established that an assignor cannot assign greater rights 
than she herself has. See Aird Ins. Agency v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 612 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980); Cheney v. Rucker. 381 P.2d 86, 
91 (Utah 1963). Accordingly, since estoppel bars Ms. Parker's 
claim for back child support, it also estops the State's action on 
her behalf. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT MS. PARKER MADE A REPRESENTATION 
INCONSISTENT WITH HER LATER ASSERTED 
CLAIM FOR CHILD SUPPORT. 
Whether Ms. Parker told Mr. Irizarry that she did not 
want his financial help was a question of credibility. Mr. 
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I r i z a r r y said she did; Ms. Parker said she did not . Questions of 
c r e d i b i l i t y are uniquely within the t r i a l c o u r t ' s domain. See 
McBride v. McBride. 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978); People 's Finance 
& Thri f t Co. of Ocrden v. Poman. 497 P.2d 17, 20 (Utah 1972). Judge 
Roth recognized tha t he had to choose who to be l i eve . He chose Mr. 
I r i z a r r y , and se t for th the evidence tha t supported t h i s choice in 
h i s f indings.1 4 (R.366-69.) 
The evidence amply supports Judge Roth 's f inding and Mr. 
I r i z a r r y ' s s to ry concerning the r ep resen ta t ions . As discussed 
below, the record contains Mr. I r i z a r r y ' s testimony on tha t po in t , 
evidence of ac t ions by Ms. Parker cons is tent with the r e j ec t ion of 
f inancia l support, evidence of circumstances t ha t make her 
r e j ec t ion of f inancia l support not improbable, and impeachment 
evidence cas t ing doubt on her t ru th fu lness . 
With respect to Mr. I r i z a r r y ' s testimony, Mr. I r i z a r r y 
t e s t i f i e d tha t Ms. Parker to ld him in a telephone conversation in 
September 1984 tha t she did not want any f inanc ia l help from him. 
(R.566.) In a l e t t e r wr i t ten by Mr. I r i z a r r y in November 1984 and 
offered in to evidence by appel lan t , Mr. I r i z a r r y sent $20 and 
thanked Ms. Parker for accepting i t , suggesting tha t contrary to 
14
 The S t a t e i s f l a t l y wrong in i t s a s s e r t i o n that the t r i a l court "did 
not i n d i c a t e t h a t Ms. Parker lacked c r e d i b i l i t y on t h i s i s s u e of f i n a n c i a l 
suppor t nor d id i t i n d i c a t e t h a t o the r tes t imony c l e a r l y c o n t r a d i c t e d Ms. 
P a r k e r ' s s t a t emen t s under o a t h . " The t r i a l cour t express ly recognized that 
whether r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s were made was an i s s u e of c r e d i b i l i t y and t h a t he was 
f i nd ing in favor of Mr. I r i z a r r y ' s tes t imony on t h a t p o i n t . (R.366-67.) 
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Ms. Parker ' s testimony, she had re jec ted h i s f inancia l support in 
September. ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit P-2.) Mr. I r i z a r r y a l so t e s t i f i e d 
about a January 1985 phone c a l l in which Ms. Parker said tha t she 
wanted nothing to do with Mr. I r i z a r r y , and tha t she was going to 
name the chi ldren "Parker" r a the r than " I r i z a r r y . " (R.572.)15 Mr. 
I r i z a r r y a l so t e s t i f i e d tha t in June 1985, a f t e r the twins were 
born, he received a telephone message tha t Ms. Parker had cal led 
and said tha t the twins were born and tha t she had named them 
"Parker." (R.454.) 
With respect to act ions by Ms. Parker consis tent with the 
re jec t ion of f inancia l support, Mr. I r i z a r r y t e s t i f i e d tha t Ms. 
Parker did not i n i t i a t e any telephone c a l l s to him between 
September 1984 and June 1985. (R.572.) Moreover, Ms. Parker 
t e s t i f i e d tha t she could not r e c a l l ever asking Mr. I r i z a r r y for 
f inancia l help between August 1984 and the time the s u i t was f i l ed . 
(R.487-88.) She a lso admitted tha t she to ld Mr. I r i z a r r y tha t she 
would name the chi ldren "Parker, " admitted tha t she did in fact 
name them "Parker, " and admitted tha t she did not ident i fy Mr. 
I r i z a r r y as t h e i r fa ther on the b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e s . (R.488.) 
Final ly , in June 1985 Ms. Parker l e f t word for Mr. I r i z a r r y tha t 
15
 The State suggests representat ions made before the twins' b ir th are 
i n e f f e c t i v e to estop Ms. Parker's claim, but c i t e s no l ega l precedent. See 
Appel lant 's Brief at 36-37. Even i f pre-bir th representat ions were i n e f f e c t i v e , 
however, Ms. Parker's pos t -b i r th statement that she had named the twins "Parker,fl 
when taken in the context of those e a r l i e r cons i s tent statements, was s u f f i c i e n t 
to estop her claim. 
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she had named the chi ldren "Parker," dr iving home her i n t e n t i o n s . 
(R.455; R.573-74.) These ac t ions forceful ly demonstrate tha t Ms. 
Parker wanted Mr. I r i z a r r y out of her l i f e and the c h i l d r e n ' s 
l i v e s , and they support Mr. I r i z a r r y ' s testimony tha t she commu-
nicated as much to him.16 
With respect to evidence of circumstances tha t make Ms. 
Parker ' s r e j ec t ion of f inancia l support not improbable, the record 
demonstrates tha t while she was pregnant Ms. Parker planned to 
f in i sh her nursing degree, enabling her to care for herse l f and the 
chi ldren.1 7 (R.484 & 450.) Ms. Parker a l so had the f inanc ia l 
support of her parents during tha t t ime. She had insurance 
coverage through her fa ther (R.530), her fa ther paid her pregnancy 
expenses not covered by the insurance (R.514 & 530). Her mother 
was wi l l ing and able to provide babys i t t ing serv ices to the 
ch i ldren . (R.491.) Thus, Ms. Parker and her parents were wi l l ing 
and able to care for Ms. Parker and the twins. 
Ms. Parker ' s r e j ec t ion of Mr. I r i z a r r y ' s help i s a l so 
supported by evidence suggesting tha t Ms. Parker would have had her 
16
 The State misses the s ign i f i cance of Judge Roth's comments that the 
p a r t i e s were antagon i s t i c . The presence of "antagonism between parents" does not 
bear on a par ty ' s r ight to support per s e . Rather, i t sheds l i g h t on the 
truthfulness of testimony -- i t i s more l i k e l y that Ms. Parker acted c o n s i s t e n t l y 
with her f e e l i n g s , than i t i s that she acted i n c o n s i s t e n t l y with them. 
17
 Again, the State misses the point of Judge Roth's f indings concerning 
Ms. Parker's school ing. Judge Roth did not suggest that Ms. Parker's education 
and career plans would "necess i tate a f inding that she did not want or need 
support from the b i o l o g i c a l father of those chi ldren." (.Appellant's Brief at 
40.) Rather, her a b i l i t y to support herse l f only makes l e s s improbable Mr. 
I r i z a r r y ' s testimony that she re jec ted h i s he lp . 
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mother's support in terminating Mr. Irizarry's involvement with her 
and the twins. First, Ms. Parker was significantly influenced by 
the desires of her mother -- when her mother discovered that Ms. 
Parker was sexually involved with Mr. Irizarry, she was very upset 
and Ms. Parker "had to" relocate to California. (R.555.) Second, 
her mother was antagonistic toward Mr. Irizarry. (R.533, 535, 536, 
561, 564). Third, Ms. Parker's mother wrote a letter to Mr. 
Irizarry that stated, among other things, that it was better that 
the twins not know Mr. Irizarry at all than for him to be less than 
a full-time father to them. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3.) Thus, 
it is not improbable that Ms. Parker rejected Mr. Irizarry's finan-
cial help and made other comments to him designed to get him out of 
her life, as Mr. Irizarry testified. 
Finally, Ms. Parker's credibility suffered from several 
significant inconsistencies between her testimony at trial and her 
testimony at her deposition concerning representations she made to 
Mr. Irizarry. These inconsistencies were pointed out to Judge Roth 
by Mr. Irizarry's counsel on cross examination of Ms. Parker. 
(R.483-85; 490-91; 496-98.) 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Irizarry,18 there is no evidence of record demonstrating that Judge 
18
 Confusingly, the State recognizes that this is the appropriate 
standard in reviewing the evidence, yet repeatedly suggests inferences that are 
not as favorable to Mr. Irizarry should operate against Judge Roth's findings. 
See Appellant's Brief at 41-42. 
96601 27 
Roth erred in believing Mr. Irizarry over Ms. Parker. Moreover, if 
Mr. Irizarry's testimony is believed, the record clearly reflects 
representations by Ms. Parker rejecting Mr. Irizarry's financial 
support. Consequently, Judge Roth's determination that Ms. Parker 
represented to Mr. Irizarry that she did not want his help was not 
clearly erroneous.19 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL WERE MET. 
Estoppel has three elements: 
"(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure 
to act by one party inconsistent with a later-
asserted claim; (2) the other party's reason-
able action or inaction based upon the first 
party's statement, admission, act, or failure 
to act; and (3) injury to the second party 
that would result from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate its state-
ment, admission, act, or failure to act." 
Vrontikis, 788 P.2d at 1048 (quoting Brixen & Christopher. 
Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
Judge Roth found that the evidence at trial satisfied all three of 
these elements. His findings cannot be set aside as clearly 
erroneous unless they are "without adequate evidentiary support or 
19
 Contrary to the State's assertion, finding an estopping representa-
tion on these facts does not place an "extreme and unwarranted" burden on 
custodial mothers. Cf. Appellant's Brief at 30. A mother does not, as the State 
asserts, have to "inform the putative father that she is expecting his child" and 
"document every attempt she had made to remind him of his statutory duty to 
provide financially for the child." See id. Under Vrontikis, a mother can 
remain silent without barring her claim for back child support. 788 P.2d 1046, 
1048. It is when a mother actively leads a father to believe that she is not 
relying on him for child support that she is barred from collecting it. 
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induced by an erroneous view of the law." Vrontikis. 788 P.2d at 
1048. 
As demonstrated below, the evidence in this case is 
sufficient to sustain Judge Roth's finding that the State was 
estopped from asserting Ms. Parker's claim to back child support. 
Judge Roth made findings on each of the three elements of estoppel 
identified in Vrontikis. Moreover, the facts here closely parallel 
the facts in Vrontikis. in which the defenses of laches and/or 
estoppel were held to bar the plaintiff's claim. 
In Vrontikis. a mother informed a father that she was 
pregnant and elected to bear the child despite the father's offer 
to pay for an abortion. After the child was born, the mother told 
a mutual friend that she did not ever want to see the father again. 
The mutual friend passed the comment on to the father. Seven years 
went by during which the mother raised the child and did not 
contact the father. During those years the father married another 
woman, started a family, and incurred various financial obliga-
tions. The mother then sued the father for back child support. 
The trial court determined that the mother, by her 
statement to the mutual friend which she knew or should have known 
would be communicated to the father, and by her silence concerning 
child support for seven years, had taken actions inconsistent with 
her later claim for back child support. The court further found 
that the father had reasonably relied on her statement and silence 
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in marrying and assuming additional financial obligations, and 
that, therefore, the mother was barred from pursuing her claim. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings. 
A. The Evidence Supports Judge Roth's Finding That Ms. 
Parker Made Representations and Took Actions Inconsistent With Her 
Present Claim for Back Child Support. On pages 3 through 5 of his 
ruling, Judge Roth found that Ms. Parker had made representations 
to Mr. Irizarry inconsistent with her claim for back child support. 
(R.366-69.) He made this finding based on his determination that 
Mr. Irizarry's version of the facts was more credible than Ms. 
Parker's. According to the Court, 
The critical, factual issue in determining 
whether the defendant should be responsible 
for support during [sic] 1985 to 1987 period 
is whether or not the plaintiff made state-
ments claimed by the defendant in those three 
phone calls. Plaintiff denies making state-
ments to him suggesting she doesn't want 
support from him for the children. 
I am resolving this issue in favor of the 
defendant for the following reasons.... 
(R.366-67.) 
As demonstrated above in Point II., if Mr. Irizarry's 
testimony is believed, the evidence overwhelmingly supports Judge 
Roth's finding that Ms. Parker made statements to Mr. Irizarry that 
are inconsistent with her present claim for back child support. 
Ms. Parker told Mr. Irizarry in September and November 1984 that 
she did not want his financial help (R.566); she told him in 
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January 1985 tha t she wanted nothing to do with him and was going 
to name the chi ldren "Parker" (R.572); in April 1985 she named the 
twins "Parker" and she did not ident i fy Mr. I r i z a r r y as t h e i r 
fa ther on t h e i r b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e s (R.488); and in June 1985 she 
cal led Mr. I r i z a r r y a f t e r the twins were born and to ld him tha t she 
had named them "Parker." (R.455; R.573-74.) 
In addi t ion , as in Vront ik is . Ms. Parker remained s i l e n t 
about her des i re for support for a long period of time a f t e r her 
representa t ions . 2 0 I t was not u n t i l the Sta te f i l ed t h i s s u i t on 
her behalf -- more than 4 years a f t e r Ms. Parker l a s t re jec ted Mr. 
I r i z a r r y ' s help -- tha t Mr. I r i z a r r y f i r s t became aware tha t Ms. 
Parker had changed her mind. (R.574.) 
Moreover, during tha t timeframe, oppor tuni t ies to contact 
Mr. I r i z a r r y ex is ted . Spec i f ica l ly , in October 1985, Ms. Parker 
communicated with Mr. I r i z a r r y ' s fa ther , Andre, but apparently did 
not t e l l him tha t she desired chi ld support from Mr. I r i z a r r y . 
(R.576-77.) In the f a l l of 1987, Ms. Parker ' s mother, Marva, 
managed to communicate with Mr. I r i z a r r y through h i s brother 
Jav ie r . (R.459; R.580-81 & P l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit P-3.) Ms. Parker 
admitted tha t in 1988 she talked with her mother about the fact 
20
 There i s no indicat ion in Vrontikis that the mother's i n a b i l i t y to 
locate the father should n u l l i f y the f a t h e r ' s estoppel defense. While 
unsuccessful attempts to locate the father might lead to a conclusion that the 
mother's hands were not unclean, and thus bar a claim for laches , estoppel does 
not require unclean hands. Moreover, once a party throws out a representation 
for another party to hear and re ly on, j u s t i c e should require the party who made 
the statement to bear the r isk that the statement cannot be recaptured and 
withdrawn. 
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that a letter had been written to Javier. (R.459-50.) Ms. Parker, 
however, never pursued this successful method of communication. In 
the fall of 1988, Ms. Parker's mother, accompanied by one of the 
twins, saw Mr. Irizarry working at the Salt Lake City airport and 
spoke to him angrily. (R.585-56.) Given Marva Parker's anger and 
the impressionable nature of young children, it is logical to 
assume that Ms. Parker, who was living with her mother and the 
twins at the time (R.504-04), became aware of this exchange. 
Nonetheless, Ms. Parker still did not attempt to contact Mr. 
Irizarry about child support. A few months later, shortly before 
filing suit, Ms. Parker herself saw Mr. Irizarry at the airport. 
(R.586.) Again, she said nothing about child support. On June 16, 
1989, with the service upon him of the complaint in this matter, 
Mr. Irizarry was first informed that Ms. Parker was seeking child 
support. (R.16.) 
As the fact finder, it was Judge Roth's unique role and 
duty to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and it was within 
his discretion to believe the testimony of Mr. Irizarry over that 
of Ms. Parker. See McBride v. McBride. 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 
1978); People's Finance & Thrift Co. of Ogden v. Poman. 497 P.2d 
17, 20 (Utah 1972). The representations and course of action to 
which Mr. Irizarry has testified are certainly sufficient to 
satisfy the first element of estoppel. See Vrontikis. 788 P.2d at 
1047, 1048 (a mother's statements to a mutual friend that she did 
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not ever want to see the father again coupled with a long period of 
silence were sufficient to estop the mother from collecting back 
child support). 
B. The Evidence Supports a Finding That Mr. Irizarry 
Relied on Those Representations and That His Reliance was Reason-
able. On pages 5 to 6 of his ruling, Judge Roth made the factual 
finding that Mr. Irizarry had met the second element of his defense 
for equitable estoppel -- that he had relied upon Ms. Parker's 
representations and that his reliance was reasonable. (R.368-69.) 
Specifically, Judge Roth stated: 
Therefore, I find that the plaintiff made 
statements, took actions that led the defen-
dant to reasonably conclude that she wanted 
nothing to do with him and didn't want his 
support. In reliance upon that, the defendant 
got on with his life, got married and started 
a family and under those circumstances should 
not be responsible for the payment of support 
until May 30, 19 89, when this complaint was 
filed. ... 
(R.368-69.) 
1. Mr. Irizarry relied on the representations and 
actions. It is undisputed in the record that Mr. Irizarry became 
romantically involved with his present wife after Ms. Parker told 
him in January 1985 that she did not want anything to do with him, 
that she would not name the twins "Irizarry" under any circum-
stances, and that she would not put his name on their birth 
certificates. (R.571.) According to Mr. Irizarry, following his 
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conversation with Ms. Parker he felt he had to "finish his degree, " 
"carry on with his life," and "start going out again, meeting 
people." (R.572.) In reliance on Ms. Parker's statements Mr. 
Irizarry "started dating his current wife [Patty] seriously." 
(R.573.) That dating relationship between Mr. Irizarry and Patty 
led to their contemplation of marriage in May 1985 (R.577), the 
conception of a child in July 1985 (R.578), their marriage in 
October 1985 (R.576), conception of their second child in July 1988 
(see R.578), conception of their third child in December 1989 (see 
id.) , and conception of their fourth child in April 992 (see id.) . 
In addition to making these decisions about marriage and 
starting a family, Mr. Irizarry also made financial decisions based 
upon Ms. Parker's representations that she was not looking to him 
for support. Specifically, Mr. Irizarry elected not to save money 
for support of the twins. (R.586.) Had he been aware that Ms. 
Parker intended to look to him for support, Mr. Irizarry testified 
that he probably would have done things differently. (R.587.) 
This evidence on reliance is akin to that in Vrontikis. 
where the father married and assumed additional financial obliga-
tions. Accordingly, it is sufficient to sustain Judge Roth's 
finding. 
2. Mr. Irizarry's reliance was reasonable. Mr. 
Irizarry's reliance on Ms. Parker's representations and actions was 
certainly reasonable. According to Mr. Irizarry, Ms. Parker did 
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not initiate a single telephone call between September 1984 and 
June 1985. (R.572.) When they did talk in that timeframe, the 
message from Ms. Parker consistently was that she did not want 
anything to do with Mr. Irizarry. (R.566, 572.) When Ms. Parker 
did call Mr. Irizarry, in June 1985, and left a message with his 
roommate, that message was consistent with the previous messages --
Ms. Parker said she had named the twins "Parker", driving home the 
point that she wanted nothing to do with Mr. Irizarry.21 (R.573-
74.) Thereafter, according to Mr. Irizarry, he heard nothing more 
from Ms. Parker until shortly before she filed suit, a period of 
approximately four years.22 
Moreover, in that time frame from July 1985 until suit 
was filed, Mr. Irizarry received other information, all of which 
was consistent with Ms. Parker's rejection of his help. Specifi-
cally, Mr. Irizarry spoke with his father, Andre, in February 1986 
and learned that Ms. Parker had visited Andre in October 1985. 
(R.576.) His father did not tell Mr. Irizarry that Ms. Parker was 
21
 At trial, Ms. Parker asserted for the first time that her June 1985 
message to Mr. Irizarry asked him to call her. At her deposition, Ms. Parker 
testified that her message did not include this request. (See R.490-91.) Mr. 
Irizarry's testimony was that the message did not include a request for him to 
call her and, moreover, that Ms. Parker hung up on his roommate (R.574.) 
22
 Mr. Irizarry denied that he ever spoke with Ms. Parker about her 
coming to Salt Lake City in October 19 85. (R.574.) Given Mr. Irizarry's plans 
to marry his present wife in the fall of 1985, it is unlikely that such a 
communication took place. Even if Ms. Parker did talk to Mr. Irizarry at that 
time, however, her own testimony was that the July 1985 telephone conversation 
did not mention financial support. Rather, she testified that she told Mr. 
Irizarry that the twins were born, what they looked like, and set up a meeting 
in October "for him to meet the twins." (R.455.) 
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seeking financial support from him, (R.576-77), a comment that one 
reasonably would have expected if in fact Ms. Parker had communi-
cated a desire for financial support to Andre.23 In addition, in 
late September or early October 1987, Mr. Irizarry received a 
letter written by Marva Parker, Ms. Parker's mother, which stated, 
among other things, that it was up to Mr. Irizarry whether he 
wanted to be involved in the twins' lives, that if he could not be 
a full-time father to the twins it was better that they never knew 
him at all, and that the Parkers24 were not interested in taking 
him to court. (See R.580 & Plaintiff's Exhibit P-3.) Mr. Irizarry 
reasonably interpreted this letter to mean, consistently with Ms. 
Parker's earlier representations, that Ms. Parker was not inter-
ested in getting financial support from him. (R.582.) In November 
1988, Mr. Irizarry saw Marva Parker at the airport in Salt Lake 
City. (R.585.) Marva did not indicate that Ms. Parker was looking 
to Mr. Irizarry for child support. (Id.) Instead, consistently 
with the letter she had written earlier, she told him "[his] court 
would not be here, it would be in heaven." (Id.) Finally, 
approximately one month before suit was filed, Mr. Irizarry saw Ms. 
Parker at the Salt Lake City airport (R.586.) Even at that time 
23
 Moreover, the State did not present any evidence that Ms. Parker told 
Andre Irizarry that she was seeking financial support from Mr. Irizarry. 
24
 The letter ambiguously used the term "we" throughout. Mr. Irizarry 
interpreted this to mean that Ms. Parker held the beliefs expressed in the 
letter. (See R.584.) 
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Ms. Parker did not tell Mr. Irizarry that she desired child 
support. (Id.) Rather, Ms. Parker simply said to the twins, "You 
see that guy over there? That is your father." (R.586.) 
Nothing Ms. Parker said or did between the time she told 
Mr. Irizarry that she did not want his financial help and the time 
the State filed suit on her behalf gave Mr. Irizarry any reason to 
believe that she did not mean what she had said. Accordingly, 
Judge Roth's finding that Mr. Irizarry's reliance was reasonable is 
amply supported by the evidence and cannot be said to be clearly 
erroneous. 
C. The Evidence Supports a Finding That Mr. Irizarry 
Would be Injured if Ms. Parker Were Allowed to Seek Back Child 
Support. Although Judge Roth made no express finding that Mr. 
Irizarry would be injured if Ms. Parker were allowed to seek back 
child support, that lack of particularity should not require 
reversal of Judge Roth's finding of estoppel. 
First, the State has not addressed this issue in its 
brief, and it is thus not properly before the court. See State v. 
Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966; State v. Yates, 834 P.2d at 602. 
Second, the State is responsible for the lack of clear 
findings on this point and should not be entitled to hold a lack of 
clarity against Mr. Irizarry. See Statement of the Case, supra at 
2-5. 
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Third, the lack of a particularized finding of injury was 
apparently not required by either the trial court or the Court of 
Appeals in Vrontikis. There, the trial court focused on the repre-
sentations, the reliance and the reasonableness of that reliance in 
making its decision that the mother was estopped. 788 P.2d at 
1047-48. This was also the focus of the Court of Appeals in 
affirming the trial court's decision. Id. Having found those 
things present, it was apparently obvious to both courts that an 
injury would follow if the defendant was forced to pay back child 
support. 
Fourth, a finding of injury is implicit in Judge Roth's 
ruling. The nature of the obligations Mr. Irizarry took on in 
reliance on Ms. Parker's statements -- the support of a wife and 
other children -- suggests in and of itself that injury will occur 
if money is diverted from those obligations to another destination. 
This is particularly the case where, as here, the facts demonstrate 
that finances are exceedingly tight. 
The evidence at trial demonstrated that Mr. Irizarry was 
the sole supporter of himself, his wife, and four children. (See 
R.427-28, 549, 587) In addition, Mr. Irizarry was paying ongoing 
child support for the twins to the extent required under the child 
support guidelines. (R.248-52, 587.) At the time of trial, he was 
supporting these eight people on earnings of approximately $1834 
per month. (R.547.) He had minimal savings of about $50 to $100 
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dollars, and owned no stocks or bonds. (R.548.) Consequently, the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that injury would 
occur, and therefore sustain Judge Roth's finding that estoppel 
barred Ms. Parker's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated above, Utah case law amply supports the 
availability of an estoppel defense in a claim for back child 
support. Vrontikis is controlling here, but even if Vrontikis were 
invalid as precedent, the availability of such a defense is 
established under the principle announced in Borland. The claim is 
also barred in its entirety by a combination of Bacras (to the 
extent Ms. Parker seeks reimbursement for past child support) and 
Wasescha (to the extent the award would constitute double support). 
Further, there is sufficient evidence of record to sup-
port Judge Roth's factual findings on each of the three elements of 
estoppel. Judge Roth chose to believe Mr. Irizarry's testimony 
over Ms. Parker's with respect to her representations and actions 
concerning child support. As the finder of fact, this determina-
tion was uniquely Judge Roth's to make. Mr. Irizarry married and 
went on with his life in reliance on those representations. 
Finally, a finding of harm to Mr. Irizarry from a back child 
support award was implicit in Judge Roth's findings and was 
apparent from Mr. Irizarry's financial circumstances. 
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In evaluating Judge Roth's findings, the only question 
for the Court of Appeals is whether Judge Roth's determinations can 
be said to be clearly erroneous. Whether the Court of Appeals 
would have resolved the conflict in the parties' stories in the 
same manner, and whether the Court of Appeals would have drawn the 
same inferences from the evidence are irrelevant to the analysis. 
Here, there is sufficient evidence of record to support 
Judge Roth's findings. Moreover, the facts as Judge Roth found 
them entitle Mr. Irizarry to a defense of estoppel under the 
applicable Utah law. Accordingly, Judge Roth's findings and 
conclusions barring Ms. Parker's claim for back child support, and 
Judge Medley's judgment implementing those findings, must be af-
firmed. 
DATED this P~ day of March, 1994. 
Barbara K. Polich 
Elisabeth R. Blattner 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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1 THURSDAY. FEBRUARY 11, 1993 
2 JUDGE'S RULING 
3 THE COURT: Good morning. We are dealing here 
4 with Case No. 3363, State of Utah and Cathy Parker vs. 
5 Harry Irizarry. This case was tried on Tuesday. I took 
6 the matter under advisement. I am about to give you my 
7 decision this morning. I will begin with the discussion 
8 of the facts as I see them. 
9 This case involved a relationship between the 
10 plaintiff and defendant that began in July of 1984. There 
11 was a brief sexual relationship between the two parties• 
12 In August or late July of 1984 the plaintiff learned she 
13 was pregnant. She was in California at the time. I 
14 believe her parents had sent her there because they 
15 disapproved of the relationship she had with the 
16 defendant. The defendant visited plaintiff in August of 
17 1984 in California and there learned that she was 
18 pregnant. At that time, he was not absolutely sure that 
19 this was his child, but he offered his support and he 
20 spent some time visiting with the plaintiff in California. 
21 The defendant then returned to Salt Lake City. 
22 In the following months there were several brief 
23 communications between the parties. It appears from the 
24 evidence that all of these communications were instigated 
25 by the defendant. There was no testimony that I recall or 
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2 
1 I found in my notes from the plaintiff or anybody else 
2 that she attempted to contact him during that period of 
3 time. In September of 1984 the defendant testifies he 
4 called the plaintiff and he claims that she said she 
5 didn't want any money and would take care of herself. He 
6 testified and there is an exhibit which is a letter sent 
7 from the defendant to the plaintiff in November of 1984. 
8 The defendant testifies that he followed up that letter 
9 with a telephone call to the plaintiff and once again she 
10 said she wanted nothing to do with the defendant. The 
11 defendant then claims to have made a call on January of 
12 1985 to the plaintiff where once again the plaintiff said 
13 she wanted nothing to do with him and she intended to name 
14 the children "Parker." 
15 In April of 1985, April 18th, twins were born to 
16 the plaintiff. She named the twins "Parker" and on the 
17 birth certificates where there was a spot for the name of 
18 the father to be put there, she did not name anyone as 
19 father. 
20 In June of 1985, the plaintiff attempted to call 
21 the defendant and talked to a roommate of the defendant, 
22 told the roommate that the children had been born and told 
23 them the name of the twins. As near as I can tell, this 
24 is the first evidence of any call from the plaintiff to 
25 the defendant between August of 1984 and June of 1985. 
3 
1 In October, 1985, the defendant married somebody 
2 else and started a family and moved to Puerto Rica. In 
3 February of 1987 the plaintiff hired a detective to find 
4 the defendant. There is no evidence he knew at the time 
5 that these attempts were being made to find him. 
6 In August of 1987 a letter was written from the 
7 plaintiff's mother to the defendant. The defendant 
8 received the letter when he returned to Salt Lake City in 
9 September of 1987. The letter, in my opinion, suggests 
10 the mother of the plaintiff was not planning to go after 
11 the defendant for money for support for these children. 
12 The evidence suggests the plaintiff was not aware the 
13 mother had written this letter. There is nothing 
14 authorizing the mother to take such a position, but the 
15 letter being received by the defendant would strengthen 
16 his reliance and his position, or his belief that nobody 
17 was looking to him for support for these children. 
18 Late in 1988 or early 1989, plaintiff observed 
19 the defendant at the Salt Lake City Airport and this 
20 complaint was filed on May 30, 1989, seeking support 
21 for the children. 
22 The critical, factual issue in determining 
23 whether the defendant should be responsible for support 
24 during 1985 to 1987 period is whether or not the plaintiff 
25 made statements claimed by the defendant in those three 
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1 phone calls. Plaintiff denies making statements to him 
2 suggesting she doesn't want support from him for the 
3 children. 
4 I am resolving this issue in favor of the 
5 defendant for the following reasons. First of all, 
6 during the period of time in question, there is no 
7 indication that the plaintiff made calls or wrote 
8 letters to the defendant asking for support. It 
9 appears that all the communications at that time were 
10 from the defendant to the plaintiff. 
11 Secondly, the plaintiff left the defendant's 
12 name off the birth certificates. This suggests to me or 
13 at least reinforces the defendant's belief that she wanted 
14 nothing to do with him. I have no trouble with her naming 
15 the children "Parker." There is no law, I am aware of, 
16 requiring that the children bear the father's name. The 
17 best interest of the children are what prevailed there, 
18 and under these circumstances, in my mind, there is 
19 nothing wrong with the children being named "Parker." 
20 But leaving the father's name off the birth certificates 
21 suggests to me some animosity toward the defendant and 
22 suggests to me that where the defendant said she said 
23 she wanted nothing to do with him, that may have been 
24 correct. 
25 Third, during the time from August of '84 to the 
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1 birth of the children, or until October of '85, plaintiff 
2 had family support* She had insurance to cover, I assume, 
3 most of the birth cost. She was about to start a career 
4 as a nurse and she was capable of supporting herself and 
5 her children. There is pretty good evidence of animosity 
6 from her family toward the defendant which suggested 
7 likely she didn't want much to do with him at the time. I 
8 find this first because the family moved her from Salt 
9 Lake City to California to discourage her relationship 
10 with the defendant. And at the time the defendant visited 
11 in California, her mother especially was very angry with 
12 the defendant. 
13 Fourth, the letter dated November 18, 1984 from 
14 the defendant to the plaintiff suggests the defendant's 
15 willingness to accept responsibility for the child and pay 
16 for support. But to me his statement in that letter 
17 thanking the plaintiff for accepting the money suggests 
18 that there had been some discussions about this in earlier 
19 conversations: that the plaintiff didn't want money from 
20 the defendant. I find it unusual that he would say "Thank 
21 you for accepting this money." 
22 Therefore, I find that the plaintiff made 
23 statements, took actions that led the defendant to 
24 reasonably conclude that she wanted nothing to do with him 
25 and didn't want his support. In reliance upon that, the 
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1 defendant got on with his life, got married and started a 
2 family and under those circumstances should not be 
3 responsible for the payment of support until May 30, 1989, 
4 when this complaint was filed. At that point he obviously 
5 knew that the plaintiff expected him to support these 
6 children. 
7 Defendant therefore should pay support back to 
8 the day of filing of the complaint. That should be based 
9 on the relative incomes of the parties, based on your 
10 stipulation, and the number of children involved. Also 
11 based on your stipulation, that will be for the period of 
12 May 30, 1989 to September 1, 1990. Plaintiff may have a 
13 judgment for the amount calculated in back support during 
14 that period of time. 
15 During the time from September 1, 1990 until 
16 now, I believe you have an agreement there is an Order 
17 determining what the amount should be and there is an 
18 amount owed that may be reduced to judgment also in 
19 the agreed upon amount. 
20 From this point forward in determining what 
21 amount should be paid, first of all, you have to determine 
22 what will be included to calculate the defendant's income. 
23 Defendant suggests that his BAQ should not be added into 
24 his income and cites the Utah statute that talks about 
25 subsidized housing. Not an off-the-wall position to take, 
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1 but my reading of the statute suggests that we are talking 
2 about welfare situations that are not a military 
3 situation, and I think the cases given me by the State 
4 are compelling and suggest the BAQ allowance should be 
5 added in to compute the defendant's income. And that 
6 is my ruling. 
7 I find that the plaintiff's situation at the 
8 present time, based on the evidence, is that she can work 
9 24 hours a week at present. If this changes, that would 
10 be a significant material change in circumstances, 
11 justifying an adjustment in the amount of support paid, 
12 but for the present timeframe her income will be 
13 calculated at 24 hours a week, at the $14.00-plus amount. 
14 The next issue is whether we should count two or 
15 four of defendant's children in determining what his 
16 support obligation should be in this case. I have gone 
17 back and forth on this. Some of the arguments that are 
18 made that justify defendant's estoppel position suggests 
19 that in reliance on the fact that he was not expected to 
20 pay support, he got married and had children. You can 
21 turn that around. After May 30th when he knows that they 
22 are asking for support, he continues to have children 
23 anyway. That goes against the defendant. But the bottom 
24 line for me is, in fairness to all of the children, we 
25 should probably count them all. It is not his youngest 
8 
1 children's fault that they were born. They require 
2 support. There is not a lot of money here to go around. 
3 So I think it is a situation where I can use whatever 
4 discretion I want and call it either way. For the 
5 benefit of all six children, I think they should all 
6 be counted. 
7 From this point forward, you will apply his 
8 income, including his BAQ allowance, plaintiff's income at 
9 24 hours a week, for six children, and determine what the 
10 support should be from that point forward. 
11 The issue of attorney's fees wasn't really 
12 presented in any meaningful way to the Court. There is 
13 evidence that the plaintiff owes 7,000-plus dollars to a 
14 private attorney in this case. I am going to order that 
15 each side pay their own attorney's fees for the following 
16 reasons. First of all, I am not persuaded that 
17 plaintiff's fees were necessary. She was represented by 
18 the State in this case. There is no evidence that any 
19 efforts by the private attorney resulted in anything 
20 that was presented to the Court. 
21 No. 2, there has been no showing that the 
22 defendant's position was without merit or taken in bad 
23 faith. So that is not a basis for awarding attorney 
24 fees. 
25 And No. 3, there is no showing that the 
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1 defendant was unable financially to pay or in a worse 
2 position to pay attorney's fees than the plaintiff. 
3 For those reasons, each party will pay their own 
4 attorney's fees. 
5 Have I forgotten any issues? 
6 MS. BLATTNER: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 
7 MR. WILSON: Your Honor, the child care. 
8 THE COURT: The child care all occurred at a 
9 time prior to 1989, didn't it, May 30th? 
10 MR. WILSON: Actually, some evidence was that 
11 she put on there were payments made in the latter part 
12 of 1989. There is one exhibit. 
13 THE COURT: Is that for the child care, the 
14 checks totaling $487.00, whatever? 
15 MR. WILSON: Yes, that was one of them. There 
16 was the Flex statement for that full entire year showing a 
17 $3,000 payment for the entire year, pluse the $487.00. 
18 THE COURT: According to plaintiff's testimony, 
19 she lived with her mother in 1989 until July, and then 
20 with her husband, and at that point I assume she is paying 
21 her mother. I guess that is two months, June and July of 
22 1989, $300 a month. Defendant will be responsibile for 
23 one-half. There was also an exhibit that money was paid 
24 to another group and if that was after May 30, 1989 — 
25 MR. WILSON: It was the last three months of 
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1 1989, Your Honor* It would be an exhibit, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: I had a copy of it, I think. I 
3 thought I did. I guess I am wrong. You both know which 
4 one it is? 
5 MS. BLATTNER: Yes, Your Honor, it was to the 
6 Children's College. 
7 THE COURT: Look at it. If it was since May 30, 
8 1989, it is the amount of 400-some-odd dollars. If it is 
9 in fact during that period, defendant will be responsible 
10 for one-half also. 
11 Ms. Blattner, will you prepare the Findings, 
12 Conclusions and Judgment? 
13 MS. BLATTNER: Yes, I will, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. 
15 MR. WILSON: Okay, thank you. 
16 (End of ruling) 
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679 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 34 
tice or judge concurring or dissenting may likewise 
give reasons in writing and file the same with the 
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the 
court shall constitute the entry of the judgment of the 
court. 
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argu-
ment, the court concludes that a case satisfies the 
criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the 
case by order without written opinion. The decision 
shall have only such effect as precedent as is provided 
for by Rule 31(f). 
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the 
entry of the decision, the clerk shall give notice to the 
respective parties and make the decision public in 
accordance with the direction of the court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 31. Expedited appeals decided after oral 
argument without written opinion. 
(a) Motion and stipulation for expedited hear-
ing. After the filing of all briefs in an appeal, a party 
may move for an expedited decision without a written 
opinion. The motion shall be in the form prescribed 
by Rule 23 and shall describe trje nature of the case, 
the issues presented and any special reasons the par-
ties may have for an expedited decision. The court 
may dispose of any qualified case under this rule 
upon its own motion before or after oral argument. 
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision. 
The following are matters which the court may con-
sider for expedited decision without opinion: 
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual is-
sues based primarily on documents; 
(2) summary judgments; 
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim; 
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction; and 
(5) judgments or orders based on uncompli-
cated issues of law. 
(c) In all motions brought under this rule, the sub-
stantive rules of law should be deemed settled, al-
though the parties may differ as to their application. 
(d) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision. 
The court will not grant a motion for an expedited 
appeal in cases raising substantial constitutional is-
sues, issues of significant public interest, issues of 
law of first impression, or complicated issues of fact or 
law. 
(e) Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If 
a motion for expedited decision is granted, the appeal 
will be given an expedited setting for oral argument 
within 45 to 60 days from the date of the order grant-
ing the motion. Within two days after submission of 
the appeal, the court will conference, decide the case, 
and issue a written order which need not be accompa-
nied by an opinion. Entry of the order by the clerk in 
the records of the court, shall constitute the entry of 
the judgment of the court. 
(D Effect as precedent. Appeals decided under 
this rule will not stand as precedent, but. in other 
respects, will have the same force and effect as other 
decisions of the court. 
(g) Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to 
the court after the case has been submitted for deci-
sion that a written opinion should be issued, the time 
limitation in paragraph (e) shall not apply and the 
parties will be so notified. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for 
money in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is 
allowed by law shall be payable from the date the 
judgment was entered in the trial court. 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Ex-
cept in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the 
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reason-
able attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or 
by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by exist-
ing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the pur-
pose of delay is one interposed for any improper pur-
pose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon re-
quest of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this rule only 
as part of the appellee's motion for summary dis-
position under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion 
or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion 
of the court, the court shall issue to the party or 
the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. 
The order to show cause shall set forth the alle-
gations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond un-
less otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The 
order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom dam-
ages may be awarded, the court shall grant a 
hearing. 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be 
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment 
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against ap-
pellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the ap-
pellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or or-
der is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs 
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall 
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In 
cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or 
officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless 
specifically required or prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, 
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The follow-
ing may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing 
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or 
typewritten brief or memoranda and attachments not 
to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in 
the preparation and transmission of the record, in-
cluding costs of the reporter's transcript unless other-
